Sagely Ease and Moral Perception Stephen C. Angle, Wesleyan University
In what is probably the most famous description of a sage in all of Chinese philosophy, the Analects tells us that when Confucius reached the age of seventy, he was able to "follow his heart's desire without overstepping the bounds" (Analects 2.4). It seems that Confucius came to be able to act properly without even trying. Now one might well suspect that at least some of the time, acting properly is easy for most of us. When not faced with a difficult choice or temptation, perhaps we get along fine. The Analects is nonetheless making a very strong claim, even if what is true of Confucius always is true of each of us some of the time. Confucius, we may assume, did find himself faced with difficult choices or temptations, and still he was able to follow his heart's desires. The implication is not that Confucius was lucky not to be challenged, but that successfully meeting any challenge was easy. We can think also of the legendary sage-king Shun 舜, who is described in the Mencius as able to feel genuine filial love, and act accordingly, even for a father who was trying to kill him . It is apparently easy for a sage to act correctly, even in the most difficult circumstances. How is this possible?
The argument of this essay is that sagely ease is the result of sagely perception, and that sagely perception, in turn, grows out of an ever-deepening commitment to view the world as susceptible to harmony. To make this case, I draw on both the Confucian tradition -particularly on the great Ming dynasty neo-Confucian thinker Wang Yangming 王陽明 （1472-1529） -and on contemporary philosophers like Iris Murdoch, P. J. Ivanhoe, and A. S. Cua. My argument operates on two levels simultaneously, since I aim both to solve important interpretive questions regarding sagely ease, and to contribute to contemporary, global philosophical work in moral psychology and virtue ethics.
Textual Interpretation and Global Philosophy
I will begin with some words on methodology. My point of departure is a particular passage from the Analects, but interpretation of the Analects is not my central goal. Rather, I am interested in ideas of sagely ease itself. My interest in these ideas has two sources: philosophical and interpretive debates internal to the Confucian tradition, and discussions within contemporary global philosophy. By "global philosophy," I simply mean contemporary philosophical practice that is open to ideas, challenges, and dialogue from around the globe. As such, my aim is to reconstruct a particular understanding of sagely ease that engages positively with other issues of global philosophical concern.
There is an inevitable tension between historical fidelity and philosophical construction.
The former pushes us toward carefully qualified, highly context-sensitive interpretations; the latter, toward generalization, loose paraphrase, critical emendation, and more. No matter what our goals, anyone dealing with an intellectual tradition finds him or herself pulled back and forth between these poles. No one is a pure "historian" or pure "philosopher." Historians cannot do their work without endeavoring to genuinely understand (and thereby become engaged by) the ideas with which their subject grappled. For their part, philosophers cannot make words they have inherited from a tradition mean whatever they want: changing things requires work, the work of engaging with the tradition's meanings, to one degree or another.
The ever-present need for even the committed historian to put on a philosopher's hat is exacerbated when the texts under study are, in one sense or another, fragmented. Aristotle's lecture notes look like seamless treatises when presented in modern editions, but scholars know them for what they are. What a scholar may see as a difficult interpretive challenge, though, can also be an interpretive opportunity. The Nichomachean Ethics infamously contains (at least) two visions of the best life for humans. We will probably never know whether Aristotle intended these to be unified in some way, actually thought there were multiple possible best lives, or would have rejected one in favor of the other, on balance. Be this as it may, his insightful comments on each ideal provide excellent grounds for philosophers to work toward a variety of possible solutions, each in its own way "Aristotelian," each of which can be assessed independently based on a variety of philosophical criteria. I propose to do something similar with the broadly Confucian idea of sagely ease. For reasons I will explain shortly, I draw primarily on the Ming dynasty Confucian philosopher, Wang Yangming. Wang's texts present challenges and opportunities that are very different from those offered by Aristotle's writings, but nonetheless leave us in a similar position of having to balance context-based interpretation with philosophical construction. Not only did Wang not write systematic treatises; he explicitly wished that the conversations he had with his students not be recorded and published.
1 Be this as it may, they were recorded, and his resulting works (including his many letters) have an open-endedness that requires some degree of philosophical construction if we are to understand them.
Philosophical construction is always part of a live philosophical tradition. When Wang
Yangming and others of his era interpreted classical Confucian writings like the Analects, they engaged in considerable construction. Sometimes this was conscious, as when one classical passage was given a new interpretation to make it fit better with another classical source that the latter-day thinker also wanted to respect. Sometimes the construction was unconscious, as when the changed social and intellectual climate pushed people like Wang to view matters differently from the ways in which individuals from the classical era would have. For example, P. J. Ivanhoe has argued convincingly that in a variety of important respects, the worldviews of later Confucians like Wang differed dramatically from those of earlier figures like Mencius, in part because of the conscious and unconscious influence of Buddhism on the later thinkers.
In this context, it is important for me to make clear that my main goal in drawing on
Wang's interpretation of Analects 2.4 is not to understand the Analects. It may be that light is shed on the ideal articulated in the Analects, but I will not argue for that conclusion here. Rather, Tang Xu asked, "Does establishing one's commitment (li zhì 立志) mean to always preserve a good thought, and to do good and remove bad?" (The teacher) replied: "When a good thought is preserved, that is Cosmic Pattern.... This thought is like the roots of a tree. Establishing one's commitment is nothing other than nurturing this good thought. To be able to 'follow one's heart's desire without overstepping the line' is simply when one's commitment has reached maturity" (Wang 1983: 89 §53; see Wang 1963: 42) .
At the core of Wang's understanding of Analects 2.4 is the idea of zhì 志, which I translate as "commitment." Before going further into how Wang would have us understand sagely action, let us take a few moments to examine zhì.
A frequently cited classical definition of zhì is "where the mind is going." 2 It is sometimes translated as "intention" or "will," but as I will show, these translations make zhì more transient than it really is. There is a continuity to zhì, as well as a varying level of personal involvement, that make "commitment" a good gloss. We can see both these aspects by comparing two early Analects passages: "The Master said, If once he is committed to humaneness, he will have no hatred" (4.4), and "The Master said, If an officer is committed to the Way, but is ashamed of having bad clothes or bad food, he is not worth taking counsel with."
(4.9) 3 The contrast between these two passages is stark: 4.4 describes a moral exemplar, while 4.9 pictures someone who has made a verbal commitment that he is apparently unable to live up to, and thus is in no sense an exemplar. We are forced to see two different levels or types of commitment: 4.4 shows genuine, full-fledged, or (to follow Wang Yangming) mature commitment; the officer in 4.9 falls short of these, though he, too, in some sense merits talk of "commitment."
In other ways, the Analects supports the idea that the depth, and thus effect, of zhì can vary. In 2.4, in fact, we are told that Confucius's moral development began with zhì: "At fifteen, I was committed to learning." This is obviously still a long way from his eventual achievement at age seventy. Other passages suggest that a person's zhì can be even more speculative than this: the people courage and a sense of direction" (11. 26). In this case, I find myself in sympathy with one translator's rendition of this person's zhì as merely his "wish" (Brooks & Brooks 150). 4 Let us now return to Wang Yangming. Recall that he explained Confucius at seventy by saying that one can "follow one's heart's desire without overstepping the line" when "one's commitment has reached maturity." To say that commitment can reach maturity (shu 熟) is obviously to say that after one has made a commitment, that commitment can deepen, or mature, over time. Interestingly enough, this dynamic conception of commitment fits somewhat awkwardly with the views of two major contemporary interpreters of Wang's thought, A. S. Cua and P. J. Ivanhoe. Our next task, then, has to be working out in more detail the case for understanding Wang's "zhì" as "commitment," along similar lines to what we have already saw in the Analects. This will involve us in two issues. First, Cua believes that zhì should be translated as "will," and understood as an "active power," whereas I have been arguing that zhì, as commitment, is something one does, and then can become a characteristic that one's mind (xin 心) can take on, rather than an independent faculty. Second, when discussing Wang Yangming's idea of self-cultivation, Ivanhoe does not find space for the cultivation of gradually deepening commitment, which leaves him with no option but to see Wang as merely demanding an unsupported "act of will." I aim to show that the idea of commitment I am exploring can complement other, perhaps more obvious, aspects of Wang's picture, with the result that Wang's views as a whole become more plausible.
Although I generally find Cua to be an extremely insightful, if difficult, commentator on Wang's philosophy, his discussion of zhì seems to point in the wrong direction. He writes:
The function of the will (zhì) is brought out in the following: "When a good thought arises, recognize it and develop it fully. When an evil thought arises, recognize it and stop it. It is the will that recognizes the thought and develops or stops it." To borrow Reid's term, the will or volition is an active power -that is, the act of determining or "the determination of the mind to do or not to do something which we conceive to be within our power." (Cua 1982: 22; he cites Wang: §71, and Reid: 58) 4 See also their rendition of Analects 5.26, also using "wish" (Brooks & Brooks 1998, p. 149) . Lau translates zhì in both of these passages as "have your heart set on" (see Analects 80 & 110-1).
In short, Cua here suggests that zhì should be understood as individual acts of determining to do or not to do something. This idea does not fit perfectly with what Wang says in the passage, though, even as Cua has translated it. Note that the zhì both notices good or bad thoughts, and then develops them or stops them. But Cua's "act of determining" suggests more of a role for the agent: one notices a good or bad thought, and then one determines one's mind in such a way that the thought is stopped or developed. For zhì to be "will" or "volition," it needs to be the second part of this process only, for this is the active or determining part.
Instead of seeing zhì as a separate faculty or power, we can reunite the recognizing and developing or stopping aspects of zhì if we see it as a characteristic that one's mind can come to take on: one can come to be committed -in a sense that I will develop below -and this will mean that one's mind recognizes-good-thoughts-and-develops-them, or recognizes-badthoughts-and-stops-them. My hyphens are meant to emphasize that to the degree one has zhì, the recognition and development (or stopping) are part of a single process. As we will see, Wang emphasizes the intimate relation between the two sides of this process in his famous doctrine of the "unity of knowledge and action." To better bring this out, I would translate Wang's language in the passage under discussion differently. Where Cua has "It is the will that recognizes the thought and develops or stops it," let us substitute "Knowing-and-developing and knowing-andstopping is commitment."
It would seem that to make a commitment is to seek to develop something: the disposition, we might say, to "know-and-develop" good thoughts and "know-and-stop" bad ones.
This returns us to the two senses of zhì we saw in the Analects: on the one hand, the verbal commitment not (yet) backed up by a disposition to follow through, and on the other hand, a fullblown disposition. How is 'establishing a commitment' like planting a tree? Wang didn't believe in the growth of the moral sprouts. From his descriptions, 'establishing a commitment' seems like lighting a fuse or starting a fire. Mencius has moments in which he insists we must simply make ourselves follow a certain course of action, but Wang's entire enterprise seems to consist of repeated acts of sheer will (Ivanhoe 2002: 105) .
The best Ivanhoe can do with Wang's simile is to see it as expressing the great time and effort it can often take to remove the selfish obstructions keeping one from awakening to one's pure knowledge. He cites Wang from another passage as follows: "In the early stages of growth, (a tree) will produce many branches, and these must be cut off. Only then can the roots and trunk grow large. In the early stages of study, the same is true. Thus in establishing a commitment, singleness of purpose (zhuan yi) is to be valued" (Wang 1983 :136 §115; translation from Ivanhoe 2002:
106, slightly modified). Ivanhoe emphasizes that Wang's discussion of trees focuses on pruning rather than on growth because he argues that eliminating selfish desires through acts of sheer will is the whole content of Wang's program of self-cultivation: "This is the only response available to him; he did not believe in the growth of the moral sense, and so he could not hope for progress from any other quarter" (Ivanhoe 2002:103) .
I agree with many aspects of Ivanhoe's reading of Wang, but his conclusion that Wang "could not hope for progress from any other quarter" seems to me to underplay an important aspect of Wang's picture. Ivanhoe apparently thinks that the only sort of growth that is relevant to self-cultivation is development of our moral sense(s), but Wang also looks to the deepening or maturation of our zhì, our commitment. Trees mature and grow; so must our zhì. Many of the passages in which Wang discusses zhì make explicit that it is something that admits of degrees; it can deepen over time. Admittedly, Wang is after something quite different from Mencius:
Ivanhoe is absolutely correct that there is a "discovery" aspect to Wang's model of cultivation.
Consider the following passage:
(A student) asked about "establishing commitment." The teacher said: "It is simply to want to preserve cosmic pattern in every thought. If one does not neglect this, in time it will naturally crystallize in one's mind. This is like what the Daoists call "the congealing of the sage-essence." If the thought of cosmic pattern is always preserved, then the gradual steps to the levels of beautiful person, great person, sage, and spiritual person are all but the cultivation and extension of this one thought. (Wang 1983: 57, §16 ; translation from Wang 1963: 25, slightly modified) 6
What needs to grow, in other words, is the consistency with which we "want to preserve cosmic pattern in every thought": this consistent disposition is zhì. Cosmic pattern itself and our ability to identify it -topics I will take up below -do not develop. We must discover the ability to identify cosmic pattern, and thus ultimately the pattern, too, within ourselves. The process of deepening our commitment is certainly related to increasing the purity with which our liang zhï shines forth. In addition, there are two active aspects to cultivating one's commitment, which I see as two sides of a single coin. One is the negative aspect on which Ivanhoe has focused, namely pruning selfish desires. I believe he has missed the positive aspect, though, which serves to bind the whole process together (and make it considerably more plausible).
The flip-side of removing selfish desires is to look actively for harmony in the cosmos. It will take me some time before I can fully flesh out this claim, and explain how it connects to other aspects of Wang's vision. As a first step, let us recognize how important harmony is to Wang. For instance, Wang was once asked to comment on an earlier Confucian's doctrine that one should "devote one's effort to the area of human feelings and human affairs." Wang agreed, noting that the course of our human affairs depend on our human feelings, and concludes that "The important point is to achieve the state of equilibrium and harmony, and achieving equilibrium and harmony depends primarily on being watchful over oneself when alone" (Wang 1983 : 73 §37; translation from Wang 1963: 34). Wang refers repeatedly to equilibrium and harmony in his conversations and letters, drawing on terminology from the classical-era text Doctrine of the Mean. In the first instance, harmony refers to the situationally-appropriate expression of emotions. The best illustration of this comes in the following passage, in which Wang responds to a student's telling him that the student was experiencing unbearable sorrow upon receiving a letter saying that the student's son was seriously ill. Wang says:
This is the time for you to exert effort. If you allow this occasion to go by, what is the use of studying when nothing is happening? People should train and polish themselves at just such a time as this. A father's love for his son is of course the noblest feeling. Nevertheless, there is naturally a place of equilibrium and harmony within cosmic pattern. To be excessive means to have selfish thoughts. On such an occasion most people feel that according to cosmic pattern they should be sorrowful. They do not realize that they are already affected by worries and anxieties and their minds will not be correct. Generally speaking, the influence of the seven emotions is in the majority of cases excessive, and only in the minority of cases insufficient. As soon as it is excessive, it is not in accord with the mind in itself. It must be adjusted to reach the mean before it becomes correct. (Wang 1983: 82 This passage nicely expresses the idea that finding harmony and avoiding selfishness go hand-inhand. I will put off further comment for now, pending discussion of the idea of cosmic pattern below.
Before moving on, it would be well to note that although Wang's discussion of harmony focuses on the harmony of one's feelings with one's situation, Wang agrees with the Doctrine of the Mean that such harmony has wide-reaching consequences. In response to a student's question about whether one should focus on inner cultivation or on implementing institutional reforms, Wang argues for the former, but concludes: "When equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, a proper order prevails in the universe and all things attain their full growth and development.
That is the full development of the nature and the fulfillment of destiny" (Wang 1983: 151 §127;  translation from Wang 1963: 84).
7 Our own harmony, that is, relates intimately to a broader harmony, namely the proper order that characterizes the cosmic pattern.
3. Connecting "Commitment" to "Unity of Knowledge and Action"
I now want to explicate Wang's teaching that knowledge (zhï 知) and action can and should be unified, by demonstrating that it is commitment (zhì 志) that makes the unification possible. This, in turn, will allow us to get further toward an understanding of the ease of sagely action (as suggested in Analects 2:4), both through my reading of the "unity of knowledge and action" doctrine itself, and through connections I will bring out between Wang's teaching and discussions in the Western philosophical tradition of moral perception. The notion of commitment will not only let us make good sense of Wang's challenging claims, but also shed important light on issues of significant cross-cultural interest.
Let us begin with some text. In his most important discussion of the subject, Wang responds to a student who cannot understand how knowledge and action can be said to be unified.
The student gives the following example to Wang: "There are people who know that their parents should be served with filial piety and elder brothers with respect but cannot put these things into practice. This shows that knowledge and action are clearly two different things."
Wang responds:
The knowledge and action you refer to are already separated by selfish desires and are no longer knowledge and action in themselves. There have never been people who know but do not act. Those who are supposed to know but do not act simply do not yet know. When sages and worthies taught people about knowledge and action, it was precisely because they wanted them to restore (knowledge and action) in themselves, and not simply to do this or that and be satisfied. (Wang 1983: 33, §5 ; translation from Wang 1963: 10, slightly modified)
Let me pause here and focus for a moment on the last sentence. Wang is emphasizing that the goal of cultivation is not simply to act correctly now and again; it is to transform oneself -to become Confucius at seventy -so that one always acts correctly. Wang continues:
Therefore the Great Learning points to true knowledge and action for people to see, saying they are "like loving beautiful colors and hating bad odors." Seeing beautiful colors appertains to knowledge, while loving beautiful colors appertains to action. However, as soon as one sees that beautiful color, he has already, automatically loved it. It is not that he sees it first and them makes up his mind to love it (Wang 1983: 33 The idea, in other words, is that when we see a color as beautiful, we thereby love it. But we can go farther than this. Wang is not just making a descriptive prediction, to the effect that those who see beautiful colors will tend to love them. His claim is really that we should love beautiful colors: part of what it is to be a beautiful color is for it to be an appropriate object of our love. In fact, the appropriateness of "loving a beautiful color" is even more apparent in Chinese, since the words that the Great Learning text uses to express "beautiful color," namely hao se 好色, could also be rendered as "lovable color." To "love a beautiful color," that is, is to hao a hao color. 10 Wang often uses the image of a mirror to capture the way we should respond to our situation: so long as the mirror is not dirtied by selfish desires, we will accurately reflect/respond to the situation. What we can now see is that such responses are not merely perceptual, but affective as well. Another way to express this idea is to say that "beautiful" is a normative concept, and to ascribe it to a particular object is thereby to accept that certain norms apply to that object. If someone agreed that a particular color was beautiful, but did not feel any love for it, we would have to wonder whether such a person shared our concept of beautiful.
Another possible case is someone who disagrees with us over whether the color in question is beautiful, and thus lovable, but who recognizes many colors as beautiful and loves 8 Wang refers to the beginning of §6 of the Great Learning. "What is meant by 'making the intention (yi 意) sincere' is allowing no self-deception, as when we hate a bad smell or love a beautiful color" (translation from Chan: p. 89, slightly modified). The Great Learning text thus agrees with Wang that allowing the self to deceive one is akin to failing to love a beautiful color. 9 Wang never uses the term "true action," but it seems natural to distinguish two senses of action, along the same lines he distinguishes two sense of knowledge. Shallow, non-true action would encompass random movements or perhaps cases in which one would say one did not know what one was doing. Wang comes close to making a distinction in this area when he refers to people "acting on impulse (renyi qu zuo 任意去做)" (Wang 1983:11 §5) . 10 Strictly speaking, these terms are pronounced slightly differently depending on whether they are used verbally (hào) or adjectivally (hâo).
them. There are really two different issues here. On the one hand, we might imagine a case where one party to the dispute claimed to have a superior sensitivity or judgment: he or she is an aesthetic expert, and rejects the common view that some particular color is beautiful. On the other hand, perhaps the disputants find themselves in wholesale disagreement about which colors are beautiful, with only seemingly random overlaps between the sets of colors each identifies (and loves). Wang would certainly deny that the second of these two cases represents a genuine dispute. He is no relativist, and so would conclude, plausibly enough, that the disputants were talking past one another: they must mean different things by "beautiful." As for the first case, claims about superior expertise seem perfectly possible.
11
Finally, imagine someone for whom seeing and loving are disconnected, in just the way Wang's last sentence denies. He or she "sees it first and them makes up his (or her) mind to love it." Is this really possible? Here again we need to distinguish two cases. Perhaps it is not initially clear to one whether the color is beautiful. The light is bad, or one needs to see more clearly the colors with which it is juxtaposed. Then one makes up one's mind, coming to see it as indeed beautiful, and thereby loves it. I think that Wang should acknowledge that such cases are possible. What Wang denies is the possibility of a different sort of hesitation, wherein one sees the color as beautiful first, and then decides whether (or not) to love it.
Consider the following case, to help flesh out what Wang is denying. Mightn't I hate a beautiful woman? Wang should respond in the affirmative, but note that this "hate" would be an all-things-considered judgment, a judgment that takes into account more than her mere appearance. Insofar as one sees the woman as beautiful, there will always be a "love" aspect to that perception/judgment. In ways that I will explore in more detail below, moral judgments depend on seeing more broadly than just looking at how attractive someone is. Whether we look 11 As discussed above, for Wang, the superior expertise -at least with respect to moral matters -will need to come from a lack of selfish obstacles to the functioning of one's liang zhï, rather than from something like the development of more highly sensitive feelings. For a discussion of the rather different model of expertise found in Mencius, see (Hutton) . Interestingly, Hutton argues that Mencius's idea of moral connoisseurship "is primarily a connoisseurship of intuition, which consists in deepening one's sensitivity to one's spontaneous impulses and in rooting out what one 'really wants' by nature" (Hutton: 175) .
narrowly or broadly, though, when we see things in the world in normative terms, we cannot separate out the seeing and the reacting.
All this discussion of loving beautiful colors is only by way of analogy to the main subject, which is ethical knowledge and action. Directly after his discussion of loving beautiful colors and hating bad odors, Wang continues:
Suppose we say that so-and-so knows filial piety and so-and-so knows brotherly respect. They must have actually practiced filial piety and brotherly respect before they can be said to know them. It will not do to say that they know filial piety and brotherly respect because they show them in words. Or take one's knowledge of pain. Only after one has experienced pain can one know pain (Wang 1983, 33 it; similarly, one must react to pain by avoiding it (all else being equal). 12 Not to react in this way is to fail to grasp the normative import of identifying something as pain: as above, Wang is making more than a descriptive prediction about people's reaction to stimuli here.
There's a lot packed into this passage, including opposition to too much book learning and a related emphasis on the need for actual experience, in concrete particularity. Be all this as it may, if we focus on the main issue at hand, we might feel tempted to conclude that there is an important disanology between the beauty case and the filial piety case. In the former, Wang says that knowing something as beautiful is to "love (hao)" it, which I have been glossing as having a positive attitude toward it. In the filial piety case, Wang says that only if we have actually "practiced (xing 行)" it can we be said to know it. "Practice" or xing is the same word that is translated as "action" in the slogan "unity of knowledge and action." Xing seems to be about more than just feelings, but then how can Wang think that the two cases are analogous? Either 
Cua on commitment to realizing a harmonious world
There is now a considerable body of contemporary Western philosophical reflection on the nature of moral perception, much of it building on ideas found in Aristotle. 13 This literature is very relevant to the ideas we are now considering. It can elaborate on ideas we have see already, as this quote suggests:
Perception is not merely aided by emotion but is also in part constituted by appropriate response. Good perception is a full recognition or acknowledgment of the practical situation; the whole personality sees it for what it is. The agent who discerns intellectually that a friend is in need or that a loved one has died, but who fails to respond to these facts with appropriate sympathy or grief, clearly lacks a part of Aristotelian virtue. It seems right to say, in addition, that a part of discernment or perception is lacking. This person doesn't really, or doesn't fully, see what has happened.... We want to say that she is merely saying the words, "He needs my help" or "She is dead," but doesn't yet fully know it, because the emotional part of cognition is lacking. (Nussbaum: 79)
Wang Yangming would clearly agree that perception is in part constituted by appropriate response. Nussbaum's reference to one who merely says the words without feeling the response sounds remarkably like Wang's "It will not do to say that they know filial piety and brotherly respect because they show them in words." We might also find in Nussbaum's reference to "acknowledgment" a hint of what still needs development, both for her account and for Wang's, namely something more about the active contribution an agent must make to a situation in order not just to "know," but to "acknowledge."
I believe we can draw on A. S. Cua's treatment of perception and commitment in Wang's thought in order to better understand both Wang and the sort of issues raised by Nussbaum and others. As an example of how Cua can push contemporary thinkers, consider the following two passages. First, here is Lawrence Blum on "perception": "I am including within 'perception' anything contributing to or encompassed within the agent's take on the situation -his salience perception -prior to his deliberating about what to do" (Blum 1991, p. 707) . Here, now, is Cua.
He is clearly working with ideas related to "the agent's take on the situation," but this gets connected to concerns distinctive of Wang:
13 Wiggins is one important source of this literature: Wiggins emphasized that for Aristotle, practical deliberation is partly constituted by the "unfinished or indeterminate character of our ideals," leading him to emphasize "situational appreciation" As a mind-in-action, moral reflection is a form of mindfulness. It is selective attention to the distinctive features of a situation informed by the agent's sense of importance. The appreciation of an occurrent situation presupposes an evaluative judgment.... Since moral reflection is directed at li as an organic unity, it is also mindful of the gestalt of the situation. Following Matson, we may say that it is an activity of apperception, i.e., the distinctive features of the organic whole are "not only perceived, but are united and assimilated to a mass of ideas already possessed, and so comprehended and interpreted." Given a commitment to ren, thinking in light of li is principally an apperception based on a moral interest (Cua 1998 : 133. The same passage also appears in Cua 1982: 64. Cua refers to Matson: 151).
There is a lot packed into this passage that I will be exploring hereafter. Of particular importance are the related ideas that first, moral perception is mindfulness of whole situations -of the relatedness among various particulars, as well as between these particulars and "ideas already possessed" -and second, that this is so because "moral reflection is directed at li as an organic unity," which itself depends on a "commitment to ren."
Li 理, or pattern, and ren 仁, or benevolence, are terms with which we have not yet dealt, and so some explanation is required. Pattern is one of the central concepts in neo-Confucian metaphysics. 14 Patterns characterize the possibilities for all things, everywhere from degenerate cases, such as a sapling dying from lack of water, to flourishing cases, such as a full-grown oak.
Singling out individual saplings or oaks is misleading, actually, because the inter-dependent nature of our reality means that individual patterns are always dependent on other patterns, and one set of patterns dependent on other sets, and so on, all the way up to the Cosmic Pattern (tian li 天理), which is, among all the possible patterns of all the patterns taken together, the idealized one in accord with which each thing does its best. Neo-Confucians characterized this norm in various ways, depending on the perspective from which it was viewed, but the essential idea is a harmonious, organic unity. Each thing is different, as arms are different from legs, but each is part of the whole. Harmony involves seeing that each element receives its due weight at each point in time. Organic is an apt characterization for the harmony in another sense: NeoConfucians saw their cosmos as vital, life-giving, and in constant motion. The "stuff" out of which the cosmos was composed, qi 氣, itself is dynamic and interactive, always manifesting a 15 Qi has been translated in many ways, from "ether" to "material force" to Gardner's intriguing "psycho-physical stuff" (Zhu) . Ivanhoe renders it "life-force" in a passage quoted on this page. Huang presents very good on the Cheng brothers' view of dao and li as "life-giving activity" .
Several aspects of this remarkable passage require comment. First, note that the term translated here as "wills" is not zhì: zhì or commitment does not come up here, because this is about the natural functioning of anyone's mind. Commitment is relevant to avoiding making oneself "small," which occurs when one allows selfish considerations to mislead one. Second, notice that the contrast here is not between one who mouths the words (e.g., "I love my parents") and one who actually feels the love: everyone, Wang says, has the various feelings he describes. Only the mind of the great man, though, is free of selfishness, and so avoids the "divided and narrow" character of the small man. This is presumably the key to moving from initial feelings to "practice," as we will explore below.
Third, and most important, this passage helps us to see that the utopian-sounding "form one body with all things" does not mean that everything must be treated equally. Commiseration, pity, and regret are not equivalent, just as the various parts of one's body are not equivalent. To feel benevolence for all is to care for all (or to be "unfeeling" to none), each in its own way or to its appropriate degree. What this way or degree is, though, must depend on the over-all context.
Here we return to Cua's claims that moral perception (1) is mindfulness of whole situations and (2) thanks to a commitment to ren, is directed at li as an organic unity. This is to say that our perception is not passive, but directed toward the realization -a usefully ambiguous word -of harmony. Commitment to benevolence is commitment to li, which in turn simply is a commitment to harmony. Cua argues that:
(Adopting) ren as a governing ideal of one's life does not imply a determinative conception of the ideal to be realized. It is to adopt an attitude and to resolve, with one's heart and mind, to look at things and events in such a way that they can become constituents in a harmonious unity without the unity being specified in advance of experience of man's confrontation with the changes in the natural world. Thus, to adopt this ideal attitude is to see human life in its morally excellent form, as possessing a coherence in which apparently conflicting elements are elements of an achievable harmonious order. The presence of conflicting elements is in experience a fact to be acknowledged. Acknowledgment brings with it a task of reconciliation.... Since the desired coherence of the moral order is not spelled out a priori, harmonization of the conflicting elements in experience is essentially a creative endeavor on the part of both the Confucian moral theorist and the agent. (Cua 1998, pp. 124-5) I find Cua's articulation of the active nature of moral perception to be compelling. We do not just passively notice moral features: We commit to seeing "human life in its morally excellent form, as possessing a coherence in which apparently conflicting elements are elements of an achievable harmonious order." This idea certainly needs spelling out, and several immediate objections spring to mind (for instance, does this just mean being naively charitable to everyone?). But I believe it can be sustained, and I believe it offers the prospect of both fitting together disparate aspects of Wang's vision, and illuminating the idea of sagely moral action more generally.
One of the key ideas Cua puts forward is the commitment to an ideal of resolving apparent conflicts. A second important aspect of his position is that these resolutions are "not spelled out a priori," from which he concludes that harmonization is "essentially a creative endeavor." To see what Cua has in mind, let us look at a passage from Wang that makes something close to these same points. Wang is speaking about the ancient sage-king Shun, who agreed to marry the sage-king Yao's daughters without first getting permission from his own parents, who would have denied permission, since they were intent on seeing that Shun's younger brother prospered, rather than Shun himself:
As for Shun's marrying without first telling his parents, was there someone before him who did the same thing and served as an example for him, which he could find out by looking into certain records and asking certain people, after which he did as he did? Or did he search into the innate knowledge in an instant of his mind's thought and weigh (quan) all factors as to what was proper, after which he could not help doing what he did. (Wang 1983 : 182 §139; translation from Wang 1963:
109-10, slightly altered. For an early discussion of this story, see Mencius 5a2)
The conclusion of this passage -that upon weighing all factors, Shun "could not help doing what he did" -is certainly relevant to an understanding of Wang's "unity of knowledge and action" doctrine. Our principal interest here, though, is in the appearance of conflict and the explicit statement that no resolution is spelled out a priori. Should Shun ask his parents' permission, or should he marry in order to provide them with grandchildren? Wang insists that neither prior texts nor exemplars could answer this for Shun.
How, then, was he to deal with the situation? Cua's gloss would be that since Shun was committed to the ideal of li, he had to find a way to see the conflictive elements of the situation as amenable to the creation of a harmonious whole. He weighs all factors, sees a solution, and acts. It would be wrong to say that Shun simply came to see that in all cases, it is better to provide one's parents with grandchildren than to ask their permission for marriage. Such a rule could easily turn into a convenient excuse for children to systematically disobey their parents.
Wang avoids such a formulaic reading of the resolution when he says: "If Emperor Shun's mind
was not sincere about (avoiding leaving his parents with) no posterity, ... then (his) marrying without telling his parents ... would be a case of the greatest filial impiety" (Wang 1983: 182) .
Perhaps more importantly, though Wang does not mention it, the case of Shun and his parents is not confined to one, isolated decision. Li is about patterns through time and space, so we should expect a harmonious resolution to be more like a process than a single action. Indeed, it should pick up on and incorporate pre-existing tendencies and past events, as well as looking to future ramifications. 16 Often it will primarily be by looking to these broader dimensions of situations that we will be able to see possibilities for harmonious resolution.
I am agreeing with Cua, in short, that seeing a situation morally is at least sometimes to engage in a creative act. Rather than following an antecedently existing rule, one sees the possibility for harmony in a way not described by any rule. This is not to say that rules are unhelpful; all of us rely on various kinds of rules most of the time. 17 And even when appreciating a particular situation as amenable to harmony does not involve the application of 16 Martha Nussbaum's discussion of the similarities between creative response, in much the sense I am describing, and improvisational rather than score-or script-based performance, is helpful here. "The salient difference between acting from a script and improvising is that one has to be not less but far more keenly attentive to what is given by the other actors in a situation." "(She) must suit her choice to the evolving story, which has its own form and continuity." As in jazz improvisation, Nussbaum continues, "The perceiver who improvises morally is doubly responsible: responsible to the history of commitment and to the ongoing structures that go to constitute her context; and especially responsible to these, in that her commitments are forged freshly on each occasion, in an active and intelligent confrontation between her own history and the requirements of the occasion" (Nussbaum: 94) . 17 The considerable literature that exists on Aristotlean practical reasoning is relevant here. See the references cited in note 15, above. The Confucian tradition also contains some theoretical discussion of this matter, usually put in terms of a contrast between jing 經 and quan 權. Jing is the rule or standard; quan means to "weigh," and refers to situationally specific decisions, often in exigent circumstances. Mencius 4a17 is a classic discussion of quan; see also (Wei 1986 ) for Zhu Xi's view of jing and quan.
existing rules, the sort of creativity in question is not the "anything goes" of unconstrained choice. It is beyond my scope here to comment on whether artistic creativity ever feels unconstrained, but the kind of moral creativity under discussion never feels that way. To the contrary, by all accounts it feels like there is but one choice to make. Shun, in the passage cited above, "could not help doing what he did" (See also (Murdoch 1970a : 40 on the feeling of "necessity" that attends moral vision). With this in mind, it may be that Cua's "creativity" model and Nivison's insistence, cited above, that moral perception is just like sense perception in that it aims to discover an independent reality, are not as different as they first appear. This is all the more true if Nivison were to recognize that the individual perceiving agent is him or herself part of the situation, and thus we cannot expect that even two sages would see a given situation the same, since their unique contributions to the situation differ from one another.
Next Steps
Let us take stock. Taking as our starting point a classic description of the ease of sagely action from the Analects, we have worked through Wang Yangming's ideas of maturing commitment; organic, harmonious pattern and universal benevolence; and what we might loosely call the unity of knowledge/perception and feeling/practice. Roughly, the idea is that a mature commitment to realizing harmony means actively seeing the world in normative terms ripe for harmonizing, and seeing the world this way is to interact with the world this way.
Two aspects of this summary cry out for better explanation and defense, which it is the task of this final section to provide. First, what does it mean, after all, for commitment to mature? Aren't we back to a stark picture of paring away all traces of the "self" through sheer acts of will? Second, why are seeing and interacting the same? As Lawrence Blum observes, "Seeing a situation in moral categories does not entail seeing one's moral agency as engaged by that situation. People often see a situation as involving a wrong but not regard themselves as morally pulled to do anything about it" (Blum: 708n9) . This is related to the question that I left dangling above, namely whether Wang's "loving beautiful colors" example was really a nonsequitur, since the feelings with which it is concerned seem importantly different from the practice (of filial piety) about which his interlocutor is asking him.
Considerable light can be shed on both these issues if we reflect on a famous example from the philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch. She writes:
A mother, whom I shall call M, feels hostility to her daughter-in-law, whom I shall call D. M finds D quite a good-hearted girl, but while not exactly common yet certainly unpolished and lacking in dignity and refinement. D is inclined to be pert and familiar, insufficiently ceremonious, brusque, sometimes positively rude, always tiresomely juvenile. M does not like D's accent or the way D dresses. M feels that her son has married beneath him. Let us assume for the purpose of the example that the mother, who is a very 'correct' person, behaves beautifully to the girl throughout, not allowing her real opinion to appear in any way.... Thus much for M's first thoughts about D. Time passes, and it could be that M settles down with a hardened sense of grievance and a fixed picture of D, imprisoned (if I may use a question-begging word) by the cliché: my poor son has married a silly vulgar girl. However, the M of the example is an intelligent and well-intentioned person, capable of self-criticism, capable of giving careful and just attention to an object which confronts her. M tells herself: 'I am oldfashioned and conventional. I may be prejudiced and narrow-minded. I may be snobbish. I am certainly jealous. Let me look again.' Here I assume that M observes D or at least reflects deliberately about D, until gradually her vision of D alters.... D is discovered to be not vulgar but refreshingly simple, not undignified but spontaneous, not noisy but gay, not tiresomely juvenile but delightfully youthful, and so on. And as I say, ex hypothesi, M's outward behavior, beautiful from the start, in no way alters. (Murdoch 1970a:17-18) .
At first blush this might seem irrelevant to the questions now on the table; Murdoch emphasizes that "M's outward behavior, beautiful from the start, in no way alters," but aren't we worried about cases of correct feeling without correct action? I want to suggest that Murdoch's case, which we can characterize as (initially) correct action without correct feeling, is actually importantly similar to the feeling-without-action case, and that the solution to both lies in maturing commitment, which Murdoch's example will also help us to understand.
It is very tempting to wonder whether M really could live up to the standard of perfect action that Murdoch grants her without genuinely seeing D as meriting it: Mightn't some situations arise in which her education about what is 'correct' fail to guide her properly?
Murdoch constructs the example as she does, though, to emphasize that moral philosophers of her day were paying too little attention to things other than overt behavior, and I am happy to confine myself to inner psychology. My contention is that Murdoch's understanding of both why M's attitude (though not action) toward D needs revision, and much of her account of how M goes about changing herself, resonate with and illuminate Wang's sometimes mysterious statements about knowledge and action.
M's problem is that her actions lack sagely ease. She is able, somehow, to get herself to act beautifully toward D, but not without psychic cost. She works to resolve this tension by "giving careful and just attention" to D, as well as to her own predispositions and expectations.
Later in her essay, Murdoch writes, "I have used the word 'attention', which I borrow from Simone Weil, to express the idea of a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality. I believe this to be the characteristic and proper mark of the active moral agent" (Murdoch 1970a: 34) . This is both structurally similar, and different in significant detail, from the Confucian picture I developed above. To say that it is "characteristic and proper" is to say that it should be an on-going undertaking, or in other words, one's commitment as an active moral agent. Indeed, looking for harmony is precisely the activity of the committed moral agent, on the Confucian view I have been developing. A loving gaze is very close to a benevolent one, especially since Murdoch's language ("upon an individual reality") allows for the possibility that the love be addressed to non-human objects (think of Wang's broken tiles). Two salient differences should also be noted. First, a "just" gaze is not the same as looking for harmony. Depending on exactly what one means by justice and by harmony, readers may feel that one or the other of these sounds more appropriate, or perhaps that neither sounds promising. Second, Murdoch's focus on "an individual reality" sounds, at least, very different from the Confucian's attention to the interrelated patterns of whole situations.
There is another important similarity between Murdoch's analysis and Wang's, which will be the focus of my attention: to the extent that things are not as they should be, both put primary diagnostic weight on the intrusions of one's "self." This similarity may not be readily apparent, because where Wang, in the passages we have examined, has been resolutely abstract, Murdoch's discussion of M is extremely concrete. Wang says that shallow knowledge and action are "already separated by selfish desires and are no longer knowledge and action in themselves," while Murdoch tells us that M reflects to herself, "I am old-fashioned and conventional. I may be prejudiced and narrow-minded. I may be snobbish. I am certainly jealous." When we think about the various characteristics that M lists, though, we can see that Wang and Murdoch are thinking along similar lines. If one is prejudiced, narrow-minded, snobbish, and jealous, one is not seeing the relevant aspects of the world in a fair, objective, balanced way. One's "knowledge" is distorted by selfish, parochial considerations. To say that M is jealous of D is to acknowledge that D looks worse to M than she really is because of M's resenting the attention that her son is paying to D, despite the fact that his shifting of some of his concern from his mother to his wife is natural and appropriate. As Murdoch puts it in another essay, "The chief enemy of excellence in morality ... is personal fantasy: the tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams which prevents one from seeing what is there outside one" (Murdoch 1970b: 59) .
Wang is similarly concerned with the ways that intrusions of self can shatter objectivity so that we see and respond to the world incorrectly. He said, "The (feelings) of pleasure, anger, joy, and sorrow in themselves are naturally in the states of equilibrium and harmony. As soon as one attaches a bit of one's own idea to them, they will be excessive or deficient, they will be selfish" (Wang 1983: 92, §58; translation from Wang 1963: 44, slightly altered) . The problem with attaching one's own ideas to one's spontaneous responses is elaborated in another passage:
When a ruler folds his arms, sits erect, and is at leisure and at peace, and his six chief ministers attends to their duties, the world will be in order. The mind should command the five sense organs in the same way. But if when the eye wants to see, the mind itself pursues the color, or when the ear wants to hear, the mind itself pursues the sound, it will be as though the ruler himself went and occupied the position of minister of personnel when he wanted officials selected, or the position of the minister of military affairs when he wanted an army transferred. When he does so not only is the substance of the ruler gone, but the six ministers cannot carry out their duties, either ( (Wang 1983 : 100, §70; translation from (Wang 1963: 48-9, slightly altered).
What does it mean to say that the eye wants to see, but the mind pursues the color? The idea seems to be that the mind usurps the eye's role, so that one sees what one's mind wants to see, rather than what is really there. This is clearly a disruption of the natural functioning of one's faculties, but I suspect more is at stake than a concern about political or psychological micromanagement. Why might a ruler take over the job of selecting officials? To ensure that his favorites are selected. This is not acting properly as a ruler, and by undermining the state bureaucracy's ability to provide itself with qualified personnel, it jeopardizes the whole government.
Wang believes, in other words, that the mind's selfish desires can somehow interrupt the natural unity of stimulus and response. This must be like coming up with excuses not do something: one ignores the real situation because it is easier or convenient at the moment. One can often talk oneself into not seeing the world as it really is. Or -more relevantly -aspects of one's background can intercede unconsciously. Returning to Murdoch's M, it isn't necessarily a bad things to be old-fashioned. But if one's old-fashioned predilections are causing one to see another person wrongly, uncharitably, then they count as prejudice or narrow-mindedness. The task M sets herself need not be to lose her old-fashioned ways and become hip, but she must work to see D fairly. In the M and D example, Murdoch gives us little guidance on how this is supposed to work; recall that she says only: "Here I assume that M observes D or at least reflects deliberately about D, until gradually her vision of D alters." In fact Murdoch has quite a lot to say about what she calls "unselfing," both in her philosophical writings and in her novels (see Antonaccio: Ch. 5 and Gordon: Ch. 2 for insightful discussion of this theme). I look forward to discussing this, both as comparison and contrast, when I look in detail at the teachings of neoConfucian moral education and moral therapy in future essays.
For now, though, let us set aside the question of how we should try to remove selfishness from the equation and concentrate on the prior question that we have been tracking: are perception, feelings, and action really as closely linked as Wang believes? We have seen that Murdoch believes that seeing correctly is essential for feeling correctly, and thus for acting with ease. Once M comes to see D rightly, she need not struggle to treat her daughter-in-law as she "knows" she should. She has achieved, at least in one small area of her life, real goodness of action, since Murdoch says that goodness is the "perfection of desire" -an idea that cannot but remind us of Confucius at seventy (Murdoch 1992: 344; cited in Antonaccio: 142) . But surely Murdoch has an easier case to make than Wang does. It is one thing to say that someone who is already doing the right thing can do it more readily -and that this should count as a moral improvement -if she can change the way she sees the world. It is a stronger claim to insist that seeing the world rightly is itself enough to both feel and act rightly. This is to say that proper perception (Wang's "knowledge") is itself sufficient for good action, even if it is not always necessary (as M shows us, by being able to act rightly even prior to re-examining D). 18 Even though the case of M does not exemplify this stronger claim, Murdoch does endorse it, writing that "true vision occasions right conduct" (Murdoch 1970b, p. 66) . In fact I think we should just see M as a special case of the more general idea that coming to see situations rightly means that we will act rightly and with ease. Perhaps the right seeing is by benevolently looking for harmony; perhaps it is through loving and just attention. In either case, what I want to emphasize is the active and, in the sense discussed above, creative nature of this looking or attending. It is not merely a passive perception. This difference is crucial for understanding the link with action, as can be seen if we consider an example offered by Lawrence Blum, an important contemporary theorist of moral perception:
Tim, a white male, is waiting for a taxi at a train station. Waiting near him are a black woman and her daughter. A cab comes by, past the woman and her daughter, and stops in front of him. Tim, with relief, gets in to the cab.
Tim's relief at having gotten a cab might block from his full awareness the cab driver's having passed up the black mother and child in favor of him. What is salient in Tim's perception might simply be the presence of the cab.
But suppose that once in the cab Tim, idly ruminating, puts the pieces of the situation together and comes to see it now (in retrospect) in a different way. He sses the driver as having intentionally passed up the woman and child. Suppose he also infers that the driver did this out of racism.... Whether Tim is correct in this inference is not so important as whether the inference is a plausible one, which I am assuming it to be. This perception of racism becomes his "take" on the situation. He now sees an issue of injustice in the situation in a way he did not at first.... Prior to any action Tim might take in the situation, it is (ceteris paribus) a (morally) better thing for him to have recognized the racial injustice than not to have done so. Blun then adds in a footnote that for all the importance of perception, its link to action is still poorly understood:
Note that seeing a situation in moral categories does not entail seeing one's moral agency as engaged by that situation. People often see a situation as involving a wrong but not regard themselves as morally pulled to do anything about it. For example, even when Tim comes to see injustice as having taken place, he may think of that injustice as over and done with and not implying anything for him to do about it. The issue of what makes a moral being see her sense of agency as engaged by a situation -and how perception fits into this -deserves further exploration than I can undertake here. (Blum: 708 n. 9) In short, while the example of M shows that one can act rightly without the ease claimed for Confucius at seventy, the example of Tim shows that one can see a situation in moral categories and yet not act.
It is worth dwelling for a moment on what Tim might be feeling. Is he too tired after a long trip to work up the indignation that might otherwise move him to act? Or perhaps he's furious, but too confused about what it makes sense to do? Too shy to interfere? On the other hand, he may see the situation, for all its wrongness, as simply not his problem. Maybe he sees the world as full of injustice, with no hope for improvement; or maybe he's less pessimistic that this, but still sees such problems as the concern of (some specific, or a vaguely general) "others."
As I am reading him, Wang says that the route to sagely ease is maturing one's commitment to looking for harmony in one's world. It is easy enough to see this slogan as variously connecting up with the different possible states of Tim's mind and heart that I have just canvassed, but the complex range of possibilities serves to emphasize that "maturing commitment" cannot be a simple or single process. A thorough account of Confucian (or Murdochian) self-cultivation will need to take this complexity into account. I endorse, that is, Blum's insistence that moral perception is not a unified capacity, and go beyond this to say that the related capacities that underlie our ability to "see our sense of moral agency as engaged" by the situations in which we find ourselves are similarly diverse (see , and 717 n. 25).
What I want to emphasize here is that while Tim makes progress in focusing enough on his situation to see it in moral terms, he is still far from exemplifying Wang's "mature commitment." That commitment entails a kind of active effort to realize harmony in both the cognitive and actualizing senses of "realize": to see how it might emerge from the present configuration of people, relationships, and so on, including one's own position in the web of events and relations making up the situation; and, by realizing one's dynamic position, move toward actualizing the harmonious possibilities inherent therein. When a commitment of this kind has matured, one has a settled disposition to look to realize harmony, which involves (among other things) seeing what one's "sense of moral agency" can contribute to realizing the harmony. As with "realize," "seeing what one can contribute" combines Wang's knowledge and action. With mature commitment, that is, there is no mere noticing that the world can be viewed in moral terms; one views the world actively, looking for the appropriate configuration into which events can resolve themselves. And since this looking is active, we have answered the central challenges of this section: namely, we have seen how perception and action can be linked in the way that Wang (and Murdoch) claims.
Exactly which further actions follow from looking to realize harmony in a given situation depend on the details of the situation. I grant that "harmony" has so far been left largely unexplored, and will be interrogating this idea (and contrasting it with alternatives, like Murdoch's) in subsequent writings. We can imagine Tim with the commitment and sagely ease of a seventy-year-old Confucius, though, and point out some of the things that would have been different. Tim-the-sage might be tired after a business trip, but would surely see the mother and daughter as he stepped up to the curb, and this seeing would not be a mere noticing, but an acknowledging. Here we are together, his smile would say. Perhaps some banter about her charming daughter -the appropriate ritual for the situation -and then up comes the cab, past the mother and stopping in front of Tim. Tim speaks to the driver, offering a charitable gloss on the driver's action -as the "teaching" most likely to make a difference in this context -and beckons the others to take their rightful seats. With a wave at the departing girl and her mother, Tim stands back to wait for another cab, reflecting on how far his society still needs to improve. This, then, is sagely ease. It comes from mature commitment. This commitment does not simply involve paring away all traces of the "self" through sheer acts of will. On Wang's picture, the commitment is, put positively, to look benevolently for harmony. Paring away selfish perspectives is the negative side of the coin; looking for harmony is the positive side. We are not asked to make unsupported acts of will because (1) there is a process through which we can build up our abilities to do these two things, and (2) the two sides of self-cultivation are mutuallyreinforcing. There is clearly much more to be said about this process, and much to be learned from reflecting on the differences between Wang's model and alternatives. We may decide that Wang himself went too far in the direction of self-effacement. These are matters for another day.
My goal here has been to make sense of Confucius at seventy. The answer, I believe, is of central philosophical importance as thinkers around the globe work to articulate ever more clearly and compellingly the ideals at which we should aim. 
